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The second Battle of Smolensk (7 August–2 October 1943) was a Soviet strategic offensive operation conducted by the Red Army as part of the Summer-Autumn Campaign of 1943. Staged almost simultaneously with the Lower Dnieper Offensive (13 August–22 September), the offensive lasted two months and was led by General Andrei Yeremenko, commanding the Kalinin Front, and Vasily Sokolovsky, commanding the Western Front. Its goal was to clear the German presence from the Smolensk and Bryansk regions. Smolensk had been under German occupation since the first Battle of Smolensk in 1941. Despite an impressive German defense, the Red Army was able to stage several breakthroughs, liberating several major cities, including Smolensk and Roslavl. As a result of this operation, the Red Army was able to start planning for the liberation of Belarus. However, the overall advance was quite modest and slow in the face of heavy German resistance, and the operation was therefore accomplished in three stages: 7–20 August, 21 August–6 September, and 7 September–2 October. Although playing a major military role in its own right, the Smolensk Operation was also important for its effect on the Battle of the Dnieper. It has been estimated that as many as 55 German divisions were committed to counter the Smolensk Operation — divisions which would have been critical to prevent Soviet troops from crossing the Dnieper in the south. In the course of the operation, the Red Army also definitively drove back German forces from the Smolensk land bridge, historically the most important approach for a western attack on Moscow. The Strategic Operations included smaller operations: :Spas-Demensk Offensive Operation (7–20 August 1943) :Dukhovshchina-Demidov Offensive Operation (1 Stage) (13–18 August 1943) :Yelnia-Dorogobuzh Offensive Operation (28 August-6 September 1943) :Dukhovshchina-Demidov Offensive Operation (2 Stage) (14 September-2 October 1943) :Smolensk-Roslavl Offensive Operation (15 September-2 October 1943) :Bryansk Offensive Operation (17 August-3 October 1943) ==Strategic context== By the end of the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, Germany had lost all hope of regaining the initiative on the Eastern Front. Losses were considerable and the whole army was less effective than before, as many of its experienced soldiers had fallen during the previous two years of fighting. This left the German army capable of only reacting to Soviet moves. On the Soviet side, Stalin was determined to pursue the liberation of occupied territories from German control, a course of action that had its first major success at the end of 1942 with Operation Uranus, which led to the liberation of Stalingrad. The Battle of the Dnieper was to achieve the liberation of Ukraine and push the southern part of the front towards the west. In order to weaken the German defenses even further, however, the Smolensk operation was staged simultaneously, in a move that would also draw German reserves north, thereby weakening the German defense on the southern part of the front. Both operations were a part of the same strategic offensive plan, aiming to recover as much Soviet territory from German control as possible. Thirty years later, Marshal Vasilevsky (Chief of the General Staff in 1943) wrote in his memoirs:
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